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In response to the DOCAM 2020 conference theme of “monsters,” in this paper I 
will address three monstrosities involving information and documentation. I will 
do so by returning to themes discussed in three of my books: The Modern 
Invention of Information, Discourse, History, and Power (2001), Indexing It All: The 
Subject in the Age of Documentation, Information, and Data (2014), and 
Documentarity: Evidence, Ontology, and Inscription (2019). These three books 
form a trilogy, discussing information and information ages at three periods and 
scales: the first book from the beginnings of the 20th  century up through today, 
the second book during philosophical and technological modernity, and in the 
third book, the theoretically and practically deployed tradition of metaphysics in 
“the West” for the past 2,500 years or so. I should add that the second book was 
written as a sort of horror story done via concepts rather than characters, so the 
conference theme really fits very well with the general outlook of that book and 
it fits the other two books, as well. 
 
In this paper I will limit myself to outlining three general forms for the 
monstrosities or horrors of  information: 1) the horror of information as the latest 
trope in the Western metaphysical tradition of what Derrida termed, “presence,” 
2) the horror of information as a mode of ideational subsumption of the empirical 
via modern information technologies and their rationale of fulfilling individual 
information needs, and 3) the horror of information and its related tropes and 
practices as the deployment of presence across history and geography as modes 
of inscription and representation, and through these, management and control. 
 
We are living through a horrifying time right now, a time that has very legitimate 
fears and present horrors and portends even worse horrors—the worst horrors 
human beings and other species as a whole have ever encountered, namely those 
leading to individual suffering and mass extinction. Trumpism, the COVID-19 
epidemic, and climate change are, when and where I write today, daily terrors. 
Each of these has been, at least partially, afforded by the above monstrosities of 
information. These horrors can only be changed by critically engaging these 
monstrosities, critically engaging the history and rhetoric of information, and 
through this, critically engaging Western metaphysics as it appears in theory and 
in practice.  
 
1. 
 
The major theme of The Modern Invention of Information is that the 
understanding and social construction of “information,” in terms of this word 
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connoting metaphysical presence, is a relatively recent development, particularly 
during the 20th century. The book also argues that this modern sense of 
information also colors the historiography and sociology of information, so that 
each information age appears anew, erasing the history of previous ones and 
denying its own historical materialism. (Thus, in the 20th century, there was not 
only “information,” but before this, “documentation,” and still to come “data,” 
each term being a trope for the same sense of presence.) As Nunberg (1996) and 
Frohmann (2004) argued as well, the term “information” is an overly inflated term, 
which not only lacks an historical understanding of how it got this way but also 
actively erases such by its very sense of representing something given, something 
empirically and epistemically present in and of itself. In its modern sense, 
“information” as a substantive noun makes us believe that the term refers to an 
entity, rather than suggesting that “information” refers to various documentary 
types or genres or is what we say we have as the result of being informed of 
something. The appearance of “information” with the internet was the advent of 
this ideational substantive in regard to widespread digital media (“new media”), 
supposedly freed from paper forms of information, such as paper-based 
documents. As such, information supposedly challenged the cost and distribution 
models of paper-based documentation and the institutions that produced and 
collected such (e.g., traditional publishers and libraries). Electronic “information” 
was said to be free, or nearly so, or wanting to be so, in contrast to paper-based 
information. In reality, of course, internet information has increasingly become 
mediated by corporate entities and the ideological constraints of users and 
providers. The argument that “information” is immaterial and that documents are 
material is a red herring, based on sloppy uses of the term “immaterial” and 
“documents.” There are digital documents and internet information is mediated 
by providers, user needs, algorithms, and search engines.  
 
“Presence” is the term that Jacques Derrida used to describe the Western 
metaphysical tradition’s manner of understanding being.  A metaphysics of 
presence assumes that the essence of being is transcendental to time and space, 
and it is self-identical or “auto-affective” in its construction (Gasché, 1986).  
 
We should understand that presence is also the form of knowledge for the 
metaphysical tradition (through philosophical modernism for both rationalism—
Descartes’ notion of “clear and distinct” knowledge—and Lockean empiricism’s 
simple ideas, up through logical positivism’s notions of statements).  In Plato’s 
works, every entity is seen as having an essence that is changeless in its form or 
idea (eidos) and truth is the correspondence of knowledge to this. 
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Correspondence theory runs through European medieval philosophy and its 
doctrine of adaequatio rei et intellectus, and up through twentieth century 
positivism’s picture theory, and in documentation and information science it is 
clearly seen in Otlet’s notion of “facts” (see Frohmann, 2007), bibliography, and 
“the Book,” and these knowledge claims echo in the internet’s small “chunk” 
rhetorical forms of webpages and memes. (In English and many other European 
languages, the term “fact” has both an ontological and an epistemic sense, and 
these are often used ambiguously with one another and as a grammatical support 
for the above epistemologies—for example, in the perfectly understandable, but 
logically ambiguous, English language sentence: “the facts of the world are given 
in the facts that the book presents [i.e., represents about them].”) From a 
positivist perspective, science is made up of statements—truths—that picture the 
world, a world which itself can be viewed as distinct entities and events. Truth is 
made up of the epistemic re-presentation of what is, as present, the 
correspondence of the essence of things and intellect.  
 
The great, and still ongoing, historical transition between medieval semiotically 
formed knowledge (where correspondence is governed by coherence theories of 
truth) and modern experimental knowledge involves struggles between the 
power and methods of representation and those of entities themselves in forming 
presence, that is, in making the appearance of what is evident into evidence. 
Today’s informational representations taken as knowledge often return us to the 
medieval realm where narrative or visual representational coherence is seen as 
grounds for truth. This has resulted in a great political tragedy, where belief has 
replaced hard-won knowledge and knowledge institutions built during modernity. 
Today, “information” is often the literal or metaphorical image of knowledge and 
its truths or potential truths. This is to say, that knowledge and its truths or 
potential truths are representational, or simply, based in the imagination (—
whether they will result in genuine knowledge or not is a more complex question). 
 
The Modern Invention of Information attempted to reassert the material 
(including rhetorical) and historical production of the concept of information, of 
informational forms and the concept of the information age, against their erasure 
by information age rhetoric throughout the 20th century. The erasure of the 
production of information  led to inflated claims about new information and 
communication technologies, and it led to information age rhetoric and 
commercial institutions that put on the defensive older knowledge institutions, 
such as libraries, government science and research institutions, universities, and 
so on.  
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We should recall that a similar displacement of older knowledge institutions by 
new information and communication technologies (e.g., cinema, radio, and 
nascent television, along with the expanded sphere of newspaper production—
i.e., “alternative news”—) happened in Nazi Germany in the 1930s, but in the 
1990s and throughout the early 21st century no one was making the connection 
between this earlier event and the information revolution. Instead, neoliberal 
technological deterministic discourses celebrated “the information highway” and 
digital corporate “innovation,” and on the other hand, libertarian and political Left 
discourses in different manners from one another equally celebrated information 
“freedom” and new emerging singularities supposedly rising out of new 
possibilities of expression through these new technologies. Technological 
utopianism was everywhere. No one really saw the resurrection of fascist 
tendencies and their empowerment by these newer technologies, even when they 
did recognize the developing remediation of the internet by old media at the end 
of the last century and the beginning of this century.  
 
The horror of information in The Modern Invention of Information is the horror of 
the trope of information as a form of presence and representation that erases its 
historical, epistemic, and material construction in the real world. The attempt of 
this book as a critical work was to reassert the materiality of information through 
historical critique.  
 
Today, the monstrosity of the modern invention of information and its 
technological and socio-cultural deployment can be seen most dominantly in fake 
news and other such phenomena, where the term “information” covers all sorts 
of rhetorical genres of texts, documents, images, conversational fragments, 
fiction, non-fiction and everything in between—anything found through digital 
means, and all being treated as having truth values or possible truth values worthy 
of our attention, and each judged the same way as one another. However, behind 
the allure and addiction of the screen and digital social connection in an otherwise 
divided, lonely, and consumerist society, lies rhetorical, ideological, and 
algorithmic mechanisms that mediate the “user,” with only a small subset of 
“information” resources belonging to processes of knowledge institutions and 
knowledge processes. Knowledge is only a small subset of what is available on the 
internet, only a small subset of “information,” with the majority of documentary 
and social media texts and linkages serving likes or dislikes, that is, taste. The 
seeking of information on the internet is largely driven by taste and by beliefs, not 
by knowledge (though the taste for knowledge may well be a driving factor). The 
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proliferation of the belief that the internet has given us “facts” (as the product of 
knowledge institutions and knowledge processes) is largely untrue. 
 
2. 
 
The theme of Indexing it All is the horror of Hegelian dialectical subsumption, 
which is the horror of the uncritical or narcissistic dialectical seeking and gathering 
of beings and events for the purpose of the subject’s self-realization through 
them. It is a horror because such an event is never started or completed by the 
subject him or herself, but by the cultural forms and social norms that make up 
the subject as a product of deeper grammatological forms and psychological and 
socio-political development, and so this drive of subsumption (in information 
science, of the seeking, hunting, and gathering of information) is, literally, ideo-
logically informed without realizing it. The horror is not only the informational 
appropriation of entities, but that the critical difference above is not revealed, but 
instead, erased with modern information (as was suggested in The Modern 
Invention of Information). 
 
In Indexing it All, the dialectic is shown through the subject’s solicitude and 
positioning toward documents and proto-documents (that is, in terms of what is 
evidence and is evident) as opposite the subject, as objects of use for the subject 
(or “user”). But Indexing it All shows that the subject’s needs and uses are actually 
formed by documents and their collections, and both user needs and  
documentary contents are inscribed in constellations of cultural forms and 
tendencies toward their deployment in social norms—that is, they are inscribed 
in  rationalities of ideas (i.e., ideologies). As any reference librarian knows, user 
needs, and so, the subject as a subject-of-(information)-needs, can only be 
expressed through the collections of documents and the metadata available to 
them, and these collections themselves reflect constellations of ideas in society 
and selected and made available through publishers. The same principle resides 
with the internet, though on a much greater and less scholarly scale.  
 
Indexing it All examines the modern conception of information in terms of 
information seeking and retrieval, as a system of dialectically formed 
“information” relations within three different modern sciences: documentation, 
information science, and data science. The dialectical logic common to each of 
these is users as subjects (of information needs) and documents as objects of that 
need.  The traditional account of this relationship in modern library science and 
information science of the past hundred and fifty years or so is that users have 
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information needs and information systems fulfill those needs with documents, 
accessed through their metadata or other means of representing, indexing, and 
organizing documents according to their documentary “subject” contents, that is 
to say, their “aboutness.” However, to repeat: this book argues that it is the 
information systems that define the nature of the subject’s information needs 
(and that of the psychological subject—the so-called “user”) through collections 
of documents and their representation through subject headings or other 
metadata and the indexing and algorithms that bring (co-index or co-position) the 
subjects and objects together, and that these are all inscribed by common 
constellations and grammars of cultural forms and social norms. 
 
As Michael Buckland has written, information indexes are backward facing in time 
(2012). Buckland’s insight is very important. The critical user of an information 
system realizes that instead of looking into the future, she, like Walter Benjamin’s 
angel of history, is being blown into the future while looking at the past, with 
heaps of language piling up at her feet. Information systems index documents, 
which are made up of collected cultural forms and social norms from the past, and 
these then help shape the future in a literate society. In a literate society—
particularly, as today, one so heavily and daily mediated by not only past records 
but the recirculation and persistence of past records—Buckland’s observation is 
especially insightful and important. As mediated by information systems, our 
expressions follow the logic (literally, through mediated taxonomies, 
programming, and graph algorithms) of past linguistic and social grammars. We 
like to think of our lives today as being very immediate, but our immediate 
attention is heavily indexed to, and so mediated by, past textual and documentary 
forms. And such literacy is not always beneficial for relationships toward each 
other and the world. (“Read” the ALA posters say—but we read now more than 
ever and many of us are not very knowledgeable.)   
 
So, the monstrosity of the modern episteme of information is that ideology guides 
the subject into their subjectivity as an “information seeker” or “user” via systems 
of signs and their norms for use, while at the same time the subject sees him or 
herself (and is seen as such within information seeking and user studies) as an 
agent of free will and choice. This belief in the free will or “rational choice” of the 
user ignores, however, that the information “user” is used by information and 
communication systems, which serve a sociotechnical political economy of 
“needs” as shaped by that economy, e.g., based in immediate and attention-based 
time biases and human and natural exploitation. Current information systems do 
serve needs: first of all, the needs of current political, cultural, social, and above 
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all, financial economies, and then the psychological needs of users as shaped 
within these. We should rethink our relationship to, particularly, “commercial 
providers” and their algorithms if we desire life values and futures other than what 
we have. 
 
I will add that when Indexing it All was published in 2014 the internet was still 
largely being seen in digital studies and cultural theory as a distinct and final break 
from twentieth century mass media, mass psychology, and fascist politics, a site 
of “emergent” singularities rather than representational subjects mediated and 
manufactured by old politics and media systems. After this book was published, I 
thought that I had perhaps overstated the case for ideological positioning via 
information and information technologies, that I was too pessimistic. But then 
Donald Trump was elected president, not simply through old media, but very 
much aided through remediated new media. Masses of people had voted for a 
figure of old prejudices and hate and a politics of mystified and falsified beliefs—
in sum, a fascist politician—at the very height of the “information revolution”! 
Trump is a figure of the old media who circulates on the new media with even 
more power than when he was a TV personality. (Italians had earlier seen 
something like this with Berlusconi in Italy, though before the more robust rollout 
of the internet and social media.) The racist and nationalist father had returned 
with all its prejudices and viciousness in order to color experience and to return 
experience to the user in terms of that coloration. This figure and its social and 
cultural figurations historically returned, with even more power than previously, 
not despite, but thanks to the internet, or at least the internet once it had been 
remediated by not only the corporations, but the logic, of old media—that is, the 
logic of culturally and socially positioning needs within normative collections of 
choices. The past was and is not dead, but lying and indexed there, waiting to be 
reawakened more fully. In evidentiary or pseudo-evidentiary information systems, 
which are based on the past, and with the heavily information mediated subject 
driven by the past’s political unconscious, the possibility of this reawakening is not 
just virtual, but real. 
 
Indexing it All was written as a sort of horror novel composed of concepts, 
depicting the Hegelian dialectic of Right as it occupies and organizes individuals 
and society through documentation, information, and data systems and their 
“sciences” (—that is, science largely understood as engineering projects, which in 
the case of information, is not just technological, but social and cultural 
engineering). 
 
7
Day: Three Monstrosities of Information
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2020
 
I was rather horrified at what my book suggested. I also felt, however, that the 
horror was much, much deeper--historically, socially, and geographically than 
modern information and its technologies and sciences. So, I wanted to write about 
the much deeper and broader horror and technologies behind modern indexing—
the social and cultural positioning and co-positioning—of persons and documents 
by ideologies and prejudices. And so, my next book, Documentarity, evolved, out 
of a fascination with the question of the figuration of being and truth in terms of 
what becomes evident and how it is afforded or allowed that evidence by different 
genres of inscription and expression, particularly in regard to practices (and limits) 
of representation. 
   
3. 
 
Documentarity: Evidence, Ontology, and Inscription (2019) was an attempt to 
extend my earlier readings of information as a kind of figuration across literatures, 
genres, methods, and history. The book examines the emergence of what is (what 
becomes evident and present) and how it is taken as what is (how it is represented 
as evidence). The book tries to account for powerful particulars in their singularity 
and their capture and mediation by a priori and a posteriori systems of 
representational evidence. The appearance of something as evident, and then 
something taken as evidential, in the mode of information, is read in terms of the 
various inscriptional techne for such, from ancient philosophy through 
contemporary computation. 
 
Recalling Erich Auerbach’s famous book Mimesis: The Representation of Reality in 
Western Literature, Documentarity overviews the relation between powerful 
particulars and Western genres of representation in the domain of inscriptionality 
or “literature” writ large, a domain which has recently become understood as 
“information.” The book asks, “what is information and informational?” in various 
genres and practices, from what’s seen today as the humanities through the social 
sciences and computational engineering. Throughout the book, the problem of 
Suzanne Briet’s antelope (an inquiry that runs throughout these three books) 
remains in the background: namely, the status of the antelope before, during, and 
after its capture and its transformation into being a zoological type by 
documentary institutions. This story, which begins Briet’s 1951 book, Qu’est-ce 
que la documentation? (Briet, 1951), exemplifies the expansion of Western 
science as “progress” following the Second World War, which she sees being led 
by documentation as a “cultural technique.” (Curiously, Bruno Latour’s very 
different account of documentary processes and information, which, however, 
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uses a similar account of colonial zoological capture, similarly passes over the 
colonial and anthropomorphic intonations of its example (1987, 1996).)   
 
In Documentarity, Briet’s story of the antelope is emblematic of the seeking, 
appropriation, and use of entities as “information,” and this suggests the problem 
of the modes or genres of inscriptionality of things as evidence for something 
other than their particular selves (for example, their type identities within natural 
or social science classifications or everyday social ontologies).  
 
These types of appropriative inscriptions underlie the mechanisms of colonial and 
postcolonial management in Western culture and then worldwide in modernity 
and are the foundations for the Anthropocene and its continuation. They are the 
basis for our system of reproduction as a system of industrial production, 
following a teleological causal model that utilizes short-sighted human and natural 
resource appropriation and exploitation. Nietzsche through Heidegger discussed 
these inscriptionalities as occurring not only through material and technological, 
but through social, cultural, and moral devices. For Nietzsche these are 
mechanisms or devices of the will to power, or for Heidegger, the mode of 
appropriative solicitude toward others understood as objects, known through the 
psychological disposition of “the will.” Within the disposition of the will, other 
people and entities, and the world itself, are seen as means toward the will’s ends, 
and so they are re-presented to the will as elements of worlds understood as 
external to the self. This is that, and as that it can be used or not used for what the 
will wants and wills toward. 
 
A concern with the history of epistemic capture and control, of documentation 
and of information, of colonialism and anthropocentrism, of appropriation 
through and as information, has occupied my work since I first started studying 
information as a graduate student at the University of California at Berkeley. It is 
the problem of presence as a function of representation and its means for control 
through communication, information, and media technologies. These devices of 
recording and record keeping, of which the ideational categories of Platonic forms 
are the exemplary epistemic device for the metaphysical tradition, are products 
of not only writing, but writing as a more permanent or “fixed” (i.e., documentary) 
form, and earlier, in oral traditions, of mnemonics. These are devices for the will, 
that is, devices for the appropriation of others according to the representational 
imagination as a means of fixity and control. 
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If the Anthropocene is to be reversed, it will require a life philosophy that breaks 
free from these habits, that brackets these technologies; it will require modes of 
everyday human being that see beyond the will’s imagination. It will require a 
value of time fundamentally at odds with our current life and modernity. We 
require a philosophy of life that both starts and ends with community or being-
with (Mitsein), stretching across the entire animal sphere with this notion, and we 
need as our core value a sense of reproduction that is responsible for future 
generations far ahead of us. And this strikes directly into the problem of not just 
the ego, not just industrial technology, but into the long historical culture of 
information, into the history of the inscription and recording of beings. 
Etymologically, to “record” is to repeat what is at heart. The horror recounted in 
Documentarity is that the heart can be stopped and removed in order to be 
preserved, and be preserved in order to control those whose heart continues to 
beat. With “information,” whether in older or newer documentary systems, there 
remains the problem of the relation of being to beings. The relation of information 
to the living and the dead, and more importantly to those still to come, lies at the 
heart of the problem of information today. 
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